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ABSTRACT 
 
23 home care providers were interviewed concerning what promotes or impedes  
quality aspects of service-giving, as defined by older customers – like service 
from familiar staff or flexible help. The influence of Social Services purchasers 
and of structures for purchasing care proved notably important. Purchasers 
affected service quality through the amounts of time which they commissioned 
and through whether they would purchase help for customers’ quality of life as 
well as for their physical survival. Quality was affected through whether care was 
purchased through fixed quantities of time or through the fulfilment of specified 
tasks. Some purchasers controlled details of everyday care-giving which other 
purchasers left to providers’ discretion.  Also influential was the attitude of 
providers themselves to giving miscellaneous occasional help like changing light-
bulbs, finding reliable private tradesmen or taking customers with them on 
shopping trips. Some providers readily gave such help and found it 
unproblematic to do so. Others prohibited it, though this seemed not always 
implemented earnestly. The most marked differences in willingness to give 
flexible help occurred between different independent sector providers, rather than 
between independent and Social Services in-house providers. A third type of 
influence on quality of home care was ‘economic’ factors like the purchasing 
power of local home care pay rates within the local labour market, local 
geography and demography. Some questions are itemised which merit inclusion 
in any evaluation of the quality of a home care provider.   
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QUALITY IN HOME CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE: FACTORS TO 
PAY HEED TO 
 
[3,986 words] 
 
INTRODUCTION  
  
Research on older home care customers’ views on service quality has 
highlighted customer priorities like receiving service from familiar staff, reliable 
and punctual visiting, customers being kept informed about changes, and help 
with miscellaneous household problems like house-cleaning, changing light-bulbs 
or obtaining a trustworthy plumber (Henwood et al. 1998, Clark et al. 1998, 
Raynes et al. 2001, Patmore 2001). This paper reports some preliminary findings 
from an on-going research project which explores what helps home care 
providers to deliver service with these characteristics (Patmore 2002, pages 1-4). 
What enables some providers to serve customers through regular, familiar staff 
while other providers do not? Why do some providers treat the changing of light-
bulbs as a standard home care responsibility, whereas others prohibit it? How 
can some home care providers regularly take customers out shopping or find 
them private cleaning or repair services, when others deem this impracticable or 
hazardous? Another research aim is to discover how providers can best tailor 
service to the differing values and preferences of each customer. For instance 
one older person may prioritise familiar staff whereas another may prize help with 
household maintenance (Patmore 2001).   
 
While only the first phase of this research is complete, early findings may benefit 
researchers and managers who evaluate home care services. Initially the project 
had envisaged explanations for providers’ differing performance – on counts like 
those just mentioned – to lie in characteristics of providers like manager attitudes, 
how staff are supervised or systems for staff rotas. While early findings confirm 
that provider attitudes are important, they also highlight powerful influences from 
the policies of Social Services purchasers and from their procedures for 
purchasing care. They illustrate some important areas for attention in any 
investigation of home care quality.  
 
METHOD 
 
For scoping purposes, the first phase of the research included an in-depth 
telephone survey with managers at 23 home care providers. Twelve localities (in 
11 Authorities) were selected to provide a range of contrasting communities, 
using the Office for National Statistics classification of Local Authorities (Office for 
National Statistics 1999).  They included a mining community, a south coast 
retirement zone, a booming Home Counties area, inner and outer London 
boroughs, northern industrial towns, a rural locality and a new town development.  
Communities can differ in ease of recruiting home care staff, for instance, or their 
proportions of very old people, or travel distance between home care customers.  
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In each locality Social Services Purchasers were asked to arrange for SPRU to 
conduct two telephone interviews with provider managers. One was with the 
Social Services in-house home care provider and another with an independent 
agency contracted by Social Services.  Twenty-three providers were interviewed 
in total.  Independent providers were mainly single unit agencies, though there 
were also regional and national organizations and a franchise. Bias may be 
towards selection of independent agencies which were well-regarded by Social 
Services purchasers – most had been awarded block contracts. More detail is 
available in Patmore (2003a). 
 
Interviews included a focus on control exercised by Social Services purchasers, 
inspired by Sinclair et al. (2000). Some sections examined how a provider treated 
customer preferences, requests and common concerns. For instance questions 
were asked about policies on how many staff were assigned per customer and 
on punctuality and variation of visit times. Willingness to help flexibly with 
miscellaneous occasional tasks was investigated concerning: taking customers 
shopping, changing light-bulbs, arranging extra house-cleaning, organising 
repairs, writing letters for blind customers and helping customers to look after 
their pets. 
 
This paper is based predominantly on these phone interviews, though 
occasionally drawing on the second phase of research, still in progress. The 
latter comprises interviews with older home care customers, care staff, provider 
managers, and Social Services Care Managers and other purchaser 
representatives.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Purchaser influences: variations in how home care was purchased - and 
how this could affect service quality 
 
Degree of control by Care Management 
The 23 home care providers covered a spectrum of purchasing arrangements. 
 
 At one end of the spectrum were two Social Services providers which still 
managed their work entirely themselves, as did all in-house providers before the 
Purchaser / Provider division became common elsewhere. At these two 
providers, provider managers received referrals directly from GPs or families, 
assessed them and decided themselves on what tasks and number of visits a 
customer needed each week. Provider managers assigned staff set tasks for 
each visit. Staff were expected to spend as long on each visit as proved 
necessary for those tasks – with recognition that this might vary day-to-day if a 
customer’s health fluctuated. This is sometimes called ‘task-centred working’. 
Under these arrangements service quality reflects considerably on provider 
management. 
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At the other end of the spectrum were six providers, both independent sector and 
Social Services in-house providers, whose services were prescribed in detail by 
Social Services purchasers. The latter would initially assess each customer and 
prescribe: how many visits per week, the exact time of day for each visit, exactly 
what tasks should be done on each visit, and the precise length of each visit. The 
prescription of fixed visit lengths (by which payment to a provider is calculated) 
sometimes leads to the label ‘time-centred working’. None of these prescriptions 
could be changed without permission from Care Management. This could 
substantially restrict providers’ flexibility. Any one-off extra time required Care 
Management’s approval as the purchaser. These providers’ customers could not 
alter their visit times without the provider contacting Care Management. A 
manager of a Social Services  provider commented: ‘If a service user says “Can 
you do my shop on Tuesday this week instead of Thursday?” that means a 
phone-call to the office, then a phone-call to a Social Worker to ask permission to 
do this.’ Obtaining permission was not always swift since some Care 
Management services often closed cases soon after assessment and a new Care 
Manager might need to be allocated to assess the request. Thus much control on 
providers’ everyday work was retained by purchasers. A purpose behind this is to 
ensure that an individual’s requirements are not  over-ridden to suit provider 
convenience. One provider, though, felt the system could tie customers rigidly to 
outdated requests about visit timings, which they themselves had made years 
earlier to Care Management at assessment. Any change would also require 
permission from Care Management concerning other customers whose visit-
times might be affected.   
  
Other providers lay between these two extremes. Seven independent providers 
were allowed minor flexibility to negotiate with customers concerning the timing of 
visits, though visit lengths and the tasks for which visits were used remained 
under Care Management control.  The remaining providers were given still 
greater flexibility by Care Management. Some of these – all Social Services  
providers -  were allowed to vary the amount of time which they gave a customer. 
Some could add around 15 minutes per visit without Care Management 
permission. Others had negotiated virtual return to traditional Social Services  
‘task-centred working’. For the latter, Care Management still produced a list of 
tasks or goals and sometimes indicated approximate visit lengths. But actual visit 
lengths and timings were substantially at the provider’s discretion. They used a 
‘task-centred’ approach, whereby each visit takes as long as needed that day to 
complete necessary tasks. 
 
‘Task-centred working’ and ‘Time-centred working’: advantages and 
disadvantages for customers 
‘Task-centred’ services are well-placed to deal with unforeseen problems, 
emergencies, increased needs for help or anything else which requires 
substantial extra time. If a home care customer’s refrigerator breaks down, some 
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‘task-centred’ services can swiftly deploy staff time to organise replacement 
without seeking Care Management permission. In contrast a ‘time-centred’ 
service would first need permission to spend the extra time. This would not 
necessarily be granted. In some Authorities Care Management would seek a 
different service for such a purpose anyway, a source of delay.  
 
But a disadvantage of ‘task-centred’ services is that they are less able to provide 
punctual visits because their visit lengths fluctuate. Also, staff leave a customer 
immediately that their tasks are finished, since they do not know what time-
consuming emergencies might lie ahead that day. Thus characteristically they 
are reluctant to spend time chatting with customers, unless towards the end of 
their round when they know whether they have spare time.  
 
In contrast, an important potential strength of ‘time-centred’ services is spare 
‘quality time’ left at the end of a fixed time slot after the tasks prescribed by Care 
Management are completed. An independent agency manager described this: 
‘A straightforward morning visit where you’re getting someone up, washed 
and dressed and making their breakfast – you’re usually allowed between 
45 minutes and an hour for this.  But it can usually be done in 30 or 35 
minutes.  So they’ve got that extra time just not to have to rush off.  So 
you’ve got that quality 10 or 15 minutes to just wash a few pots while 
you’re having a natter with them or a pot of tea.  It’s a personal touch I 
think….I think that’s why this business has developed so well….That little 
bit extra.  That ten minutes when you can get the vacuum out and vacuum 
round for them or make a cup of coffee or check the fire’s alright or iron 
that shirt.  It’s little things like that which make all the difference.’  
 
Two factors are crucial to whether ‘time-centred’ home care gives customers this 
benefit. One is whether Care Management commissions visit lengths which are 
long enough for spare time to arise. The Care Management service, which 
commissioned the provider just quoted, deliberately commissioned slightly longer 
visits than usually needed so as to allow for customers’ fluctuating health. When 
spare time arose, Care Management expected it to be used exactly as the 
provider described. But there were other Authorities where providers said that 
Care Management commissioned visit lengths so short that spare time could 
never arise. The second crucial factor is whether home care staff actually stay 
the full time prescribed and offer extra help, if they finish Care Plan tasks early. 
Some provider managers firmly insisted on this, as a key element in service 
quality. But half the providers allowed their staff to leave, if they finished early. 
Some independent agencies saw early departure as compensating for non-
payment of travel time between customers. Some Care Management services 
expected providers to offer customers the full time they were paid for. But there 
were others which preferred, even pressed, for staff to leave early as long as 
they informed Care Management, since this showed where visit lengths might be 
reduced. Standard 6.2 of the new Domiciliary Care Standards now requires staff 
to ‘work for the full amount of time allocated’ (Department of Health 2003). But, 
where early departures have long been officially sanctioned, arguments about 
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interpreting this can be anticipated.   
 
While ‘time-centred’ visits can routinely give customers small extra services and 
company, a disadvantage concerns any occasional help which needs longer than 
the spare time at the end. During this research, various incidents have been 
encountered which recall the desire for flexible help often voiced by older home 
care customers in research on quality. A home care customer lost her keys – 
could her home care worker be authorized to spend time getting a duplicate cut 
from the keys held by the agency? A care worker arrived at a customer’s home to 
find she had been burgled overnight - could the worker spend time comforting the 
customer, contacting the police and organising repairs? Likewise, who could help 
a customer whose refrigerator had broken down? These situations are especially 
difficult for those older people who have no nearby relatives nor helpful 
neighbours to turn to. Some ‘task-centred’ home care services in the study could 
respond immediately and effectively. But, as mentioned earlier, a ‘time-centred’ 
service would normally first need Care Management’s agreement to purchase the 
time required.  
 
Purchasers differed in types of help commissioned for older people 
A particular issue was requests for extra time which concerned an older person’s 
quality of life rather than simply maintaining their survival. Here there were 
important differences between Authorities in their readiness to commission help. 
This affected both the services initially purchased from a provider and Care 
Management’s responses to subsequent requests. Some Authorities would 
commission only help which was necessary for maintaining physical survival - 
like personal care, meals and cleaning of kitchen and bathroom. In contrast, 
other Authorities would sometimes add, say, help with an older customer’s pet, 
extra house-cleaning or periodic accompanied shopping outings. Two Care 
Management services sometimes included instructions that home care should 
make sure they chatted with certain isolated customers during visits.  
 
Providers often recognised when Care Management was restricting help for older 
people, through contrasts with the more varied, holistic help which was 
commissioned for their customers aged under 65 years. For instance one 
independent agency manager was commissioned to provide regular ‘baking 
together’ sessions with a physically disabled woman aged under 65. She 
commented how similar help would not be commissioned for many older     
physically disabled customers of hers, though their morale might likewise benefit. 
Another manager described how her disabled customers’ services would be 
trimmed of such quality elements when they reached 65. In seven of the 11 
Authorities studied, providers said that Care Management restricted help for older 
people’s quality of life, compared to their younger customers from Social 
Services branches for Physical Disability, Learning Disability, Mental Health or 
Children and Families. An obvious difference concerned the commissioning of 
home care workers to provide leisure outings, which was common only for 
younger customers. Yet this is something which older home care customers seek 
too (Raynes et al. 2001).  Age discrimination runs counter to the National Service 
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Framework for Older People (Department of Health 2001) and Fair Access to 
Care Services (Department of Health 2002).    
 
Provider influences on the quality of care 
 
Alongside these influences from purchasers, there was evidence of important 
differences between provider managers’ viewpoints, which affected the quality of 
service which customers received. For instance, some providers would take 
customers out shopping or to a park or look after their pets if, and only if, Care 
Management commissioned such help. But some providers would not give such 
help even if Care Management tried to commission it - including Social Services 
providers which refused such requests from within their own organization. And 
some providers routinely gave such help even when Care Management did not 
commission it – either through the flexibility of ‘task-centred working’ or, at ‘time-
centred’ independent agencies, somehow squeezing it in. One agency manager 
deliberately circumvented a highly cost-conscious Authority through discreetly 
adding tea and conversation to home care tasks.  
 
Certain providers, notably independent agencies, strove to organize each 
customer’s service so that much of it was provided by a single, main worker, who 
sometimes had a formal keyworker role. Other providers, in contrast, strove to 
prevent such relationships lest the main worker leave or complications arise in 
the staff-customer relationship.  
 
Providers’ policies varied concerning different types of flexible help - like 
accompanied outings, help to find plumbers or gardeners, changing light-bulbs, 
extra cleaning or pet care (Patmore 2003a). Some activities were routinely 
permitted, some routinely forbidden and some required management permission. 
Quite often the managers interviewed seemed more permissive than their 
organisation’s official position. Their staff may bend the rules still further, as 
described by Sinclair et al. (2000) . 
 
Notably, even where managers defended restrictions, they often could not supply 
examples of actual problems which had generated the restriction. An exception 
was restrictions on close staff-customer relationships, where cautionary tales 
were readily forthcoming as explanations. But, for every activity which some 
provider prohibited because of envisaged problems, there was another provider 
which was performing it without difficulties. There were providers who routinely 
and confidently were taking customers shopping, changing light-bulbs, supplying 
a key-worker or engaging private tradesmen for customers’ home repairs.   
 
Two contrasting independent agency managers convey how provider attitudes to 
flexible help can differ. On every topic investigated, Manager A actually required 
her staff to provide types of help which were often, at best, given only semi-
covertly at other services. Recommending private tradesmen, like plumbers, 
gardeners or electricians, was widely forbidden among survey respondents and 
this prohibition was taken unusually seriously.  Manager A, however, not only 
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recommended such services but, if needed, would also have her staff phone 
them on behalf of their customers and be present to promote a fair transaction 
when the tradesman called.  She explained: 
‘They’re asking the home carer to do it for them because there isn’t 
anyone else to do it for them – they’ve got no family, friends or neighbours 
to rely on … We’ve always done it.  It’s part and parcel of caring for 
someone really.’ 
Manager B, in contrast, prohibited staff from changing light bulbs, let alone 
recommending repair services. His focus was on minimising risk to his agency.  
‘Beware that if you start giving some help which was an extra, that you 
didn’t have to give, that if any problems result from it, you may be held 
accountable by Social Services and others … The easiest way is you just 
don’t do it’. 
 
Independent providers often divided quite sharply between those which broadly 
shared Manager A’s outlook and those which resembled Manager B. Social 
Services providers came somewhere between the two positions. It seemed 
possible that certain independent agencies had learned to address common 
customer priorities through serving many private customers alongside their 
publicly-funded customers. Private customers were a quarter or more of 
customers at these customer-responsive agencies, which were also keen to offer 
publicly-funded customers private extra services, if desired. But at many other 
independent agencies private customers were less than 10% of the list - and two 
would not accept them at all. Nor were they keen to sell private extra services to 
their publicly-funded customers. For instance they might not advertise private 
extra services and, if asked for them, some wanted them administered by Social 
Services Care Management, rather than dealing direct with the customer. Behind 
this seemed a view that the Social Services Department was the customer of 
importance, not the individuals it funded. Fulfilling the block contract with Social 
Services was what mattered to these agencies. This meant fulfilling those tasks 
prescribed in customers’ Care Plans, not giving them supplementary help. 
Offering private extras might even, one provider suggested, look like 
unprofessional ‘touting for trade’.  
 
Access to privately-paid extra help is, anyway, important for any study of home 
care quality to investigate. Its presence or absence can explain customer 
satisfaction or frustration, since it can ameliorate shortcomings of publicly funded 
home care – in either sector. Some customers of Social Services providers were 
receiving privately-paid extra help via freelance work by their home care workers. 
Where cuts have been made in cleaning by publicly-funded staff, the same 
workers may continue cleaning for their customers on a private basis. At some 
Social Services providers this is widely supported by managers. 
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‘Economic’ influences on quality of home care 
 
Quality of home care was also affected by what could be called ‘economic’ 
influences – how local home care pay and conditions interacted with the local 
labour market, local geography and demography.  
 
An independent agency manager, in a partly rural catchment, described how she 
felt forced to give some customers 6 pm bedtimes, a commonly criticised practice 
in home care. Customers’ bedtime preferences, she said, covered an 8 pm – 10 
pm timespan. But staff could not be induced to travel out in the evening for the 
earnings possible during just a two hour period – for which neither higher rates 
for evening work nor travel time were paid. So a small number of staff provided 
all evening visits from 6 pm to 10 pm, thus earning more through a four hour ‘run’ 
of visits each.  
 
To retain staff in London could require that an agency offered them very long 
hours – far above 40 per week – if low hourly pay rates were to cover London 
living costs. If those long staff hours are largely spent providing morning rises, 
lunches and bedtimes, some of these may occur at times of day which do not suit 
customers. The latter can occur too if a Social Services provider has staff on full-
time contracts, dating from the era when home care undertook much house-
cleaning, and these long hours must now be used for personal care and meals. 
(Wherever possible, in fact, providers sought part-time staff, whose worktime 
could be all deployed simultaneously at the peak times when customers needed 
service.) 
 
Some economic factors seem beyond the influence of purchaser or provider. In 
remote rural areas, customers who live near each other may have to be visited at 
similar times, preferences regardless. One independent provider worked in a high 
growth area which has featured in national news stories about shortfalls in many 
basic services through labour shortage. It faced serious staff shortages and 
trimmed home care to basics. It would not advertise private extra help to publicly 
funded customers, reserving staff time for its block contract with Social Services. 
   
But some economic factors can be addressed. One independent provider had 
faced repeated difficulties in supplying reliable, consistent weekend service – a 
common source of customers’ complaints (Sinclair et al. 2000). The problem had 
been solved when increased funding from purchasers was used for a 50% 
premium for weekend working. This secured staff agreement to rotate weekend 
work on a regular basis. Normally independent agencies paid only 10% or 15% 
extra for weekends. Yet the Social Services providers, whom they are replacing, 
paid 50% extra, sometimes double for Sundays. In a very rural area, a purchaser 
and independent provider were likewise jointly tackling problems of obtaining 
staff when pay was low and travel time both lengthy and unpaid. Purchasers 
agreed to pay a new very high pay-rate plus mileage costs for visits to particular 
villages. The provider was also planning an innovative staff recruitment 
approach.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The initial scoping interviews with provider managers showed plainly how 
provider attitudes and strategies were only one of the elements which shape the 
quality of a home care service. There were separate purchaser, provider and 
‘economic’ influences.  
 
However, while separate in one sense, these influences can interact. Examples 
have just been given for how purchasers and providers could counter certain 
‘economic’ influences.  Also, ‘economic’ influences may affect the policies of both 
purchasers and providers. For instance, two of the most cost-conscious 
purchasers served localities with high proportions of older residents.  
 
Purchasers can select or terminate providers on the basis of whether provider 
attitudes and practices appeal to them - though sometimes they use providers, 
who are not ideal, through lack of alternatives or knowledge of provider quality. 
Providers can adapt themselves so as to attract a particular purchaser. 
 
Sometimes providers can choose purchasers with whom they feel compatible. 
For instance a small independent provider had worked extensively with two 
Social Services Departments plus private customers. It then chose to drop one 
Department and increase its private clientele. But there were other independent 
providers which depended on a single Social Services Department, since 
geography permitted none other and they lacked private customers. Social 
Services in-house providers faced strictly limited options. But some had 
negotiated successfully to change to short-term or specialized work with older 
people, which permitted a preferred, more autonomous relationship with 
purchasers, or to increase work for other branches of Care Management 
(Patmore 2003a, 2003b). 
 
Sometimes Social Services and an independent provider become mutually 
dependent through a large block contract. What interaction between purchaser 
and provider approaches to quality occurs under these conditions? Subsequent 
stages of this research examines this. 
 
An important general finding is how much home care quality can be affected by a 
public purchaser’s policies and the procedures whereby care is purchased (for 
instance whether providers can vary visit lengths or timings). Figure 1 lists some 
enquiries useful within any evaluation. Subsequent stages of this research 
examine in detail the practical approaches taken by those providers which 
successfully provided flexible, customer-responsive care. It also explores how 
Social Services purchasers might use their formidable influence to encourage 
providers in this direction.  
 
[ENDS] 
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Figure 1. 
 
Evaluating quality of home care – questions worth including 
 
• What parts do purchaser, provider and customer play in determining the 
following: 
 Amount of time per customer? 
 Timing of visits? 
 Tasks undertaken? 
 
• Are fixed lengths prescribed for visits? 
 Is enough time commissioned for staff to complete prescribed tasks 
comfortably? 
 Do purchaser and provider positively want staff to stay full length? 
 How do staff use any spare time during visits? 
 
• For what range of tasks / needs / purposes does Social Services 
commission home care? What will it not commission? 
 
• Does a home care provider maintain a list of prohibited tasks? 
 
• Do customers privately purchase extra services - from their main home 
care provider or elsewhere? 
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